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We thank Proudfit et al. (2013) for
their thoughtful response to our Review.
The gist of their commentary is that
motivation and emotion play a larger
role in the relationship between anxiety
and the error-related negativity (ERN)
than conceived in our compensatory
error-monitoring hypothesis (CEMH;
Moser et al., 2013). Here we respond
to Proudfit et al.’s commentary in three
ways:
(1) We clarify that our view does in fact
place motivation and emotion center-
stage in the anxiety-ERN relationship.
(2) We reiterate that there is currently
little compelling evidence that an
enlarged ERN in anxious individu-
als reflects “the disposition to respond
more strongly to uncertain threat”
(Proudfit et al., 2013, p. 1).
(3) We emphasize that our analysis
focuses specifically on the func-
tional significance of the elevated
ERN characteristic of many anxious
individuals.
As in our original review (Moser et al.,
2013), we treat anxiety as a multi-faceted
dimensional construct that varies from
mild to severe, with anxiety disorder
patients falling at the severe end of this
continuum (Watson, 2005; Brown and
Barlow, 2009). The foundation of our
CEMH is that an enlarged ERN is not
related to all forms of anxiety, instead
it is linked primarily to the anxious
apprehension or worry facet of anxi-
ety (Nitschke et al., 2001; Moser et al.,
2012). Indeed, our meta-analysis indi-
cated that worry, obsessions, and related
future-oriented catastrophic thoughts
showed the strongest association with
enlarged ERN. Furthermore, we believe
that motivation and emotion play an
important role in the relation between this
facet of anxiety and the ERN. Specifically,
we suggest that worry, a negatively
valenced cognitive-emotional construct
(Newman et al., 2013), simultaneously
depletes working memory and enhances
compensatory processes aimed at coun-
teracting this depletion (cf. Eysenck et al.,
2007; Vytal et al., 2013). Our view is that
anxiety-related modulation of the ERN
results from this compensatory effort.
Thus, our CEMH considers emotion
and motivation as important players in
the anxiety-ERN relationship, counter to
Proudfit et al.’s characterization of our
view.
We also provided a range of evidence
supporting the CEMH. In particular, we
showed (1) that worry-related anxiety was
associated with an enlarged ERN in the
presence of unaltered behavioral perfor-
mance, (2) that loading working memory
with non-valenced information (a neu-
tral analog for the effects of worry) also
enlarged the ERN, and (3) that worri-
ers with an enlarged ERN performed bet-
ter in school than worriers with relatively
smaller ERNs, but similarly to non-
worriers. These results strongly suggest
that an enlarged ERN among individu-
als high in worry serves a compensatory
function.
The findings in support of our CEMH
are not well explained by Proudfit et al.’s
perspective that an enlarged ERN in anx-
iety reflects a heightened threat response.
Principally, their perspective does not
account for the meta-analytic finding that
worry demonstrates the most robust link
with the enlarged ERN. In fact, their view
is that worry is not necessary for enhanced
ERN in anxiety. It is likewise unclear how
their position would explain the other
findings we reported in support of our
CEMH (listed above). Thus, our first con-
cern with Proudfit et al.’s conceptualiza-
tion is that their threat sensitivity proposal
does not capture a number of anxiety-ERN
findings.
Our second reservation with Proudfit
et al.’s perspective is that existing research
does not clearly support their view that
an enlarged ERN in anxiety reflects a
heightened threat response to errors. To
make the case that modulation of the
ERN reflects enhanced sensitivity to errors
in anxiety there needs to be convinc-
ing evidence that anxiety, ERN, and
other (potentially intervening) measures
of threat sensitivity are interrelated. To
date, little compelling evidence exists for
this multivariate relationship. Specifically,
the ERN is uncorrelated with other phys-
iological markers of defensive respond-
ing to errors, including error-related skin
conductance, heart rate changes (Hajcak
et al., 2003), or error-potentiated startle
(Riesel et al., 2013). In fact, we reana-
lyzed the significant ERN-startle relation-
ship reported by Hajcak and Foti (2008)
and show that the observed relation-
ship was dependent on a single outlier
(r = −0.07 vs. r = −0.38 with the out-
lier included; See Appendix for details of
this reanalysis). The ERN is also unre-
lated to perfectionistic concerns about
mistakes (Pieters et al., 2007; Schrijvers
et al., 2010; Tops et al., 2013), the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 64 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Moser et al. Compensatory processes in anxiety-ERN relationship
tendency to view personal mistakes neg-
atively and to interpret them as failures
(Frost et al., 1990). This is important
because perfectionistic concerns about
mistakes is an individual difference that
should have direct relevance to the ERN
if the ERN is conceptualized as a dis-
position to react more negatively to
errors. Although many forms of anxiety
do correlate with concerns about mis-
takes (Antony et al., 1998), just because
anxiety is related to self-reported con-
cerns about mistakes does not mean
enlarged ERN reflects this perfectionistic
concern in anxious individuals. Moreover,
concerns about mistakes seems to cut
across a number of different anxiety
problems whereas our meta-analysis sug-
gests increased ERN is more specific to
worry-related anxiety.
To provide evidence for their threat
sensitivity hypothesis Proudfit et al.
cite a study wherein undergraduates
scoring high on negative affect showed
increased ERN and increased error-
related skin conductance (Hajcak et al.,
2004). However, there are potential lim-
itations with this conclusion. First, the
relationship between negative affect
and the ERN is unclear—Luu et al.
(2000) actually found that negative
affect was associated with an overall
smaller ERN. Second, although indi-
viduals high in negative affect showed
increased ERN and error-related skin
conductance what was missing was a
correlation between ERN and error-
related skin conductance in the high
negative affect individuals, which could
have provided more direct support for
the multivariate relationship Proudfit
et al. suggest.
Perhaps most problematic for their
view are the data showing that obses-
sive compulsive patients fail to demon-
strate an especially large ERN to errors that
are punished with monetary loss (Endrass
et al., 2010). Specifically, Endrass et al.
showed that whereas non-anxious con-
trol participants evidence an enlarged ERN
during a condition in which errors were
punished with monetary loss compared
to a no punishment condition, obses-
sive compulsives failed to evidence any
change in ERN between conditions. Why
is this null result so important? Because,
if the ERN is modulated by what Proudfit
et al. refer to as “affect that is inte-
grally related to errors” (p. 2), which
includes when errors are punished, and
anxious individuals are characterized by
increased threat response to errors, then
it follows that the obsessive compulsives
should have demonstrated a larger ERN
to punishment compared to a no pun-
ishment condition more so than controls.
However, this was not the case. In fact,
the null finding is directly supportive of
our CEMH and consistent with Eysenck
et al.’s attentional control theory (Eysenck
et al., 2007) on which our CEMH was
largely based. That is, anxious individuals
are proposed to engage in compen-
satory effort during standard conditions—
resulting in an enlarged ERN—and thus
cannot exert additional effort in a more
effortful punishment condition—because
they are already at ceiling—the net effect
of which would be no ERN modulation
across conditions.
Flipping this “integral affect” notion
on its head, Proudfit et al. cite Bartholow
et al. (2012) who showed that alcohol
ingestion reduced the magnitude of the
ERN via its reduction of negative affect.
Proudfit et al. argue that these findings
suggest that “when [participants] ingest an
anxiolytic agent that leads them to care
less about their errors, the ERN decreases”
p. 2. Although Bartholow et al.’s find-
ings are suggestive that ERN is sensi-
tive to changes in state negative affect,
we take issue with the conclusion that
the reduction in negative affect result-
ing from ingesting alcohol reduced ERN
because of reduced concern about mis-
takes. The general reduction of negative
affect in the alcohol group does not nec-
essarily imply that participants cared less
about their mistakes or that they experi-
enced less affect related to errors, per se.
For example, behavioral indicators from
Bartholow et al. suggest that individuals
in the alcohol group were well aware of
their mistakes and even made appropri-
ate adjustments to their mistakes com-
pared to the no-substance control group.
It also seems important to point out that,
in fact, Bartholow et al.’s results may be
supportive of our CEMH in that alco-
hol may have reduced worry and there-
fore reduced the ERN. The same may
also be true of other studies showing that
anxiolytic agents reduce the amplitude
of the ERN (e.g., Johannes et al., 2001).
Thus, although extant research suggests
that ingestion of anxiolytic agents reduces
the amplitude of the ERN, the mediat-
ing psychological mechanism is unclear at
present and could certainly include reduc-
tion of worry. Regardless, our main point
is that none of these findings directly
speak to the role of this integral affect
in the relationship between anxiety and
enlarged ERN. The only data we are aware
of that are relevant to the role of integral
affect in the relationship between anxiety
and enlarged ERN are those of Endrass
et al. (2010) mentioned above, and their
findings are not supportive of Proudfit
et al.’s hypothesis, but rather fit with
our CEMH.
Finally, the interesting developmen-
tal considerations outlined by Proudfit
et al. do not rule out the possibility that
enhanced ERN in anxiety reflects compen-
satory processes. Proudfit et al. have shown
that the ERN is unchanged (Meyer et al.,
2012), diminished (Torpey et al., 2013),
or enhanced (Meyer et al., 2013) in anx-
ious or anxiety-prone children under the
age of 10, whereas it is clear that enhanced
ERN characterizes anxious adults (Moser
et al., 2013). Thus, it is unclear how the
change in the anxiety-ERN relationship
across development excludes the possibil-
ity that compensatory mechanisms link
the two in adults. It is possible, for
instance, that anxious children are char-
acterized by diminished ERN, consistent
with their tendency toward poor effort-
ful control (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 2009),
but later compensate for such impairment
with enhancement of similar mechanisms
to maintain some level of functioning
(see also Gee et al., 2013 for a descrip-
tion of a similar compensatory develop-
mental process). This is an interesting
possibility we are currently examining in
our laboratory.
We emphasize that developmental con-
siderations are important for both the-
oretical and practical reasons. Likewise,
we agree with Proudfit et al. that inten-
sive longitudinal studies across significant
periods of development will help clarify
whether the ERN is a cause or a conse-
quence of anxiety. On this point, if the
ERN emerges as an endophenotype for
anxiety it could certainly reflect compen-
satory processes. Nonetheless, we simply
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believe the existing developmental litera-
ture is too sparse and inconsistent to serve
as a strong basis for drawing inferences
about the functional relationship between
anxiety and ERN.
To reiterate, the motivation in develop-
ing the CEMHwas to understand the func-
tional significance of the elevated ERN
characteristic of many individuals with
heightened anxiety. We do not attempt
to provide an overarching account of
the much broader and thornier relation
between anxiety and threat. This is a criti-
cal distinction between our view and that
of Proudfit et al. Our central claim, one
that we believe is better supported by the
existing data, is that the enlarged ERN
characteristic of some anxious individuals
and patients reflects compensatory cogni-
tive control.
Finally, although we have outlined our
disagreements with Proudfit et al.’s posi-
tion, there is clearly benefit for this line
of research—and for science in general—
to having opposing views on the same
findings. Future work in this area ide-
ally should attempt to directly adjudicate
between our view and that of Proudfit
et al., as well as develop alternatives that
may ultimately prove more accurate.
Our view and that of Proudfit et al. also
leverage somewhat different literatures—
cognitive science/neuroscience versus
affective-motivational science/ neuro-
science, respectively—and so clearly a
union of such synergistic perspectives
will eventually be needed. At the heart
of the anxiety-ERN relationship is likely
an interplay of cognition and emo-
tion/motivation, to the extent that the two
are meaningfully separable (Shackman
et al., 2011; Pessoa, 2013). Alternatively,
it seems fair to say that motivated cog-
nition is at the heart of the anxiety-ERN
relationship.
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APPENDIX
FIGURE A1 | (A) The reproduced scatterplot; the arrow indicates an
outlying data-point. (B) The reproduced scatterplot after the outlying
data-point has been removed. (C) Cook’s Distance for each participant.
(D) The correlation between the ERN and error-potentiated startle
calculated for the remaining 30 participants after each participant is
iteratively removed.
Based on a visual inspection of the scat-
terplot in Figure 2 of Hajcak and Foti
(2008), we identified a possible outlier that
may have inflated the relationship between
the ERN and error-potentiated startle.
To confirm this impression, we repro-
duced the scatterplot using Dagra software
(Blue Leaf Software, Inc.; see Altmann and
Schunn, 2012 for an identical procedure)
and assigned each participant an arbitrary
ID number. The results of this procedure
can be seen in Figure A1A.
We first computed Cook’s Distance
for each ERN and startle value. Cook’s
Distance measures the effect of deleting
individual observations from a data set
and is useful in identifying outlying and
unduly influential data points (Cook and
Weisberg, 1982). Guidelines on the inter-
pretation of this statistic vary, but a value
exceeding 1 is often used to identify out-
liers (Cook andWeisberg, 1982). As can be
seen in Figure A1C, one participant (ID =
20) met this criteria for both the ERN
(D = 1.8) and startle (D = 1.5) thereby
corroborating the impression gleaned by
visual inspection; this participant is iden-
tified in Figure A1A by the arrow. Finally,
we iteratively removed individual partici-
pants and computed correlations between
the ERN and error-potentiated startle for
the remaining 30 participants. These data
are presented in Figure A1D. Removing
the outlier identified in the previous
analysis reduced the −0.38 correlation
to −0.07; when any other participant
was removed, the correlation ranged
from −0.34 to −0.46. The effect of
removing this participant can be seen in
Figure A1B.
Overall, the results of this reanaly-
sis suggest that the association between
the ERN and error-potentiated startle
reported by Hajcak and Foti (2008) was
highly dependent on a single data point. A
conservative but reasonable interpretation
is that there is little compelling evidence
for an association between the ERN and
error-potentiated startle in the Hajcak and
Foti (2008) data.
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